KEPLER: Facilitating Control-flow Hijacking Primitive Evaluation for Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities

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Background

- OS kernels are written in low-level languages C/C++
 - Linux: C
 - Windows: C and C++
- OS kernels are prone to memory corruption bugs
 - Out of Bounds Access, Use-After-Free, data race and even type confusion (in C++ components)
- Bugs in OS kernel are plenty and many of them are exploitable
- Exploit Mitigation: make exploit harder with ignorable cost
 - The cost to prove exploitability is increasing
- Exploitability: a predicate related to each bug
- A concrete "kernel exploit" could serve as a proof of exploitability



Background (cont.)

- Automatic exploit generation systems: capable of generating concrete exploits
- Automatic exploit generation systems in two steps:
 - 1. Identifying exploit primitives
 - 2. Evaluating exploit primitives
- Exploit primitive:
 - A machine state which empowers an attacker to craft an exploit (a.k.a. programming weird machine)
 - Data flow: Writing 8 bytes anywhere, write 1 byte to adjacent heap chunk etc.
 - Control flow: Control-flow hijacking
- Control-flow hijacking primitive is one of the most popular exploit primitives.



Crafting a control-flow hijacking kernel exploit

Adjusting syscall parameters and memory layout

2

Getting a control-flow hijacking primitive

Executing exploitation payload




- Step 1. Adjusting parameters of system calls and memory layout
 - [USENIX-SEC18][CCS 16]
- Step 2. Getting a control-flow hijacking primitive
 - [P0 blog][POC16]
- Step 3. Payload execution
 - [USENIX-SEC 14]


[USENIX-SEC14] Vasileios et al., ret2dir: Rethinking Kernel Isolation [CCS 16] Xu et al., From Collision To Exploitation: Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel.

[USENIX-SEC18] Heelan et al., Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitation. [P0 blog] Andrey Konovalov. Exploiting the Linux kernel via packet sockets. [POC2016] Dong-hoon you. New reliable android kernel root exploitation techniques.


Key Step: from control-flow hijack to ROP payload execution



Challenge 1. kernel exploit mitigations




Challenge 2. ill-suited exploit primitive



copy_from_user(dst, src, size)



Challenge 3. exploit path pitfall



Our Solution: "single-shot" exploitation






- Challenges
- Our Technique
- Evaluation with real-world Linux kernel vulnerabilities
- Conclusion



Overview of "single-shot" Exploitation

ennState



Stack smashing gadget

static long bsg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg){


struct sg_io_v4 hdr; // destination is local variable

copy_from_user(dst, src, size)

- Data channel between user-space and kernel-space
- Destination is kernel stack for 91% invocations of copy_from_user() in Linux kernel 4.15.
- Short return
 - Check for non-zero return value and returns -EFAULT
 - Short return path exists for more than 99% invocations in Linux kernel 4.15

if (copy_from_user(&hdr, uarg, sizeof(hdr))) {
 return -EFAULT; // short return

. . .






Bypassing stack canary: stack disclosure gadget

- copy_to_user(to, from, n)
 - Copying kernel data to userspace
 - Src is usually kernel stack (82% in 4.15)
 - Short return path exists
- Problem:
 - Caller of copy_to_user also protected by stack canary

SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gettimeofday, struct timeval *, tv, struct timezone *, tz){

struct timeval ktv;


```
if(copy_to_user(tv, &ktv, sizeof(ktv))) {
  return -EFAULT;
```





Bypassing stack canary (cont.)

- Auxiliary function gadget
 - Protected by stack canary
 - controllable indirect call
- Leaking stack canary by combination of
 - Auxiliary function, and
 - Canary disclosure gadget





Enhancing register control: blooming gadget

- Linux kernel code have features of object-oriented programming
 - "self" passed as first parameter
- Blooming gadget:
 - Given register rdi is under control
 - A family of kernel functions containing an indirect call
 - target is controllable
 - three parameters of the indirect call are controllable

		555
(static vo *vma) {>	id aliasing_gtt_unbind_vma(struct i915_vma
	(vma->	vm->clear rangetyma->vm, vma>node.start,
	vma->siz	e);
	}	
	1	push rbp
an	2	push rbx
	3	mov rbx, rdi
	4	mov rax, QWORD PTR [rdi+0xa8]
	5	mov rbp,QWORD PTR [rax+0x330]
	6	mov rax, QWORD PTR [rdi+0xf8]
	7 8	mov rdi,QWORD PTR [rbp+0x3f28]
	9	mov rdx, QWORD PTR [rbx+0xd0]
	10	mov rsi, QWORD PTR [rbx+0x40]
	11	pop rbx
	12	pop rbp
	13	mov rax, QWORD PTR [rdi+0x468]
	14	jmp rax 14



Bridging gadget

- Bridging gadget
 - Containing multiple controllable indirect calls
- Spawning two CFHPs and combining canary leak and stack smash into a single shot.


map

void regcache_mark_dirty(struct regmap *map){
map->lock(map->lock_arg);// the 1st control-flow
hijack

map->cache_dirty=true;


map->no_sync_defaults=true;

map->unlock(map->lock_arg);// the 2nd controlflow hijack



Implementation

- Collecting candidate gadgets with static analysis
 - Built on IDA-Pro SDK 6.95
- Taking Exploit chain identification as a tree search problem
 - 28 workers to search different sub-trees concurrently
- Stitching gadgets with symbolic execution
 - Built on angr
 - Initialization: QEMU snapshot
 - Pruning: checking constraints satisfiability at key locations
 - State explosion mitigations:
 - Giving up after 20 steps for each stage
 - Entering a loop for less than 5 times.



Evaluation

ID	ID Vulnerability type			FUZE	KEPLER
CVE-2017-16995	OOB readwrite	à	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-15649	use-after-free	\checkmark	X	\checkmark	\checkmark
CVE-2017-10661	use-after-free	X	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-8890	use-after-free	×	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-8824	use-after-free	\checkmark	X	\checkmark	\checkmark
CVE-2017-7308	heap overflow	\checkmark	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-7184	heap overflow	\checkmark	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-6074	double-free	\checkmark	X	×	\checkmark
CVE-2017-5123	OOB write	à	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-2636	double-free	X	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2016-10150	use-after-free	X	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2016-8655	use-after-free	à	X	à	\checkmark
CVE-2016-6187	heap overflow	X	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2016-4557	use-after-free	X	X	X	\checkmark
CVE-2017-17053	use-after-free	X	X	X	×
CVE-2016-9793	integer overflow	X	X	X	×
2	use-after-free	à	X	X	\checkmark
0CTF-knote	uninitialized use	X	X	X	\checkmark
CSAW-stringIPC	OOB read&write	à	X	×	17 🗸
	CVE-2017-16995 CVE-2017-15649 CVE-2017-10661 CVE-2017-8890 CVE-2017-8824 CVE-2017-7308 CVE-2017-7308 CVE-2017-7184 CVE-2017-6074 CVE-2017-5123 CVE-2017-5123 CVE-2016-6187 CVE-2016-6187 CVE-2016-4557 CVE-2016-9793 TCTF-credjar 0CTF-knote	CVE-2017-16995OOB readwriteCVE-2017-15649use-after-freeCVE-2017-10661use-after-freeCVE-2017-8890use-after-freeCVE-2017-8890use-after-freeCVE-2017-8824use-after-freeCVE-2017-7308heap overflowCVE-2017-7184heap overflowCVE-2017-6074double-freeCVE-2017-5123OOB writeCVE-2017-2636double-freeCVE-2016-10150use-after-freeCVE-2016-6187heap overflowCVE-2016-6187heap overflowCVE-2016-4557use-after-freeCVE-2016-9793integer overflowTCTF-credjaruse-after-free0CTF-knoteuninitialized use	CVE-2017-16995OOB readwrite \checkmark †CVE-2017-15649use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2017-10661use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2017-7308heap overflow \checkmark CVE-2017-7184heap overflow \checkmark CVE-2017-6074double-free \checkmark CVE-2017-5123OOB write \checkmark †CVE-2017-2636double-free \checkmark CVE-2016-10150use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2016-8655use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2016-6187heap overflow \checkmark CVE-2016-4557use-after-free \checkmark CVE-2016-9793integer overflow \checkmark TCTF-credjaruse-after-free \checkmark †OCTF-knoteuninitialized use \checkmark	IDVulnerability typeexploit \bigcirc CVE-2017-16995OOB readwrite \checkmark † \checkmark CVE-2017-15649use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-10661use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-8824use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-7308heap overflow \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-7184heap overflow \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-6074double-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-5123OOB write \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2017-2636double-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2016-10150use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2016-6187heap overflow \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2016-6187heap overflow \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2016-6187use-after-free \checkmark \checkmark CVE-2016-9793integer overflow \bigstar \checkmark CVE-2016-9793integer overflow \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark \square \square \square \square \square \square \blacksquare \blacksquare \square \square \blacksquare \blacksquare \square \blacksquare <td>IDVulnerability type$exploit$$Q$FUZECVE-2017-16995OOB readwrite$\checkmark \dagger$XXCVE-2017-15649use-after-free\checkmarkX\checkmarkCVE-2017-10661use-after-freeXXXCVE-2017-8890use-after-freeXXXCVE-2017-8890use-after-free\checkmarkX\checkmarkCVE-2017-7308heap overflow\checkmarkXXCVE-2017-7308heap overflow\checkmarkXXCVE-2017-7184heap overflow\checkmarkXXCVE-2017-6074double-free\checkmarkXXCVE-2017-5123OOB write$\checkmark \dagger$XXCVE-2017-5123OOB write$\checkmark \dagger$XXCVE-2016-10150use-after-freeXXXCVE-2016-8655use-after-free$\checkmark \dagger$XXCVE-2016-6187heap overflowXXXCVE-2016-6187use-after-free$\checkmark \star$XXCVE-2016-9793use-after-freeXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9794uninitialized useX<td< td=""></td<></td>	IDVulnerability type $exploit$ Q FUZECVE-2017-16995OOB readwrite $\checkmark \dagger$ XXCVE-2017-15649use-after-free \checkmark X \checkmark CVE-2017-10661use-after-freeXXXCVE-2017-8890use-after-freeXXXCVE-2017-8890use-after-free \checkmark X \checkmark CVE-2017-7308heap overflow \checkmark XXCVE-2017-7308heap overflow \checkmark XXCVE-2017-7184heap overflow \checkmark XXCVE-2017-6074double-free \checkmark XXCVE-2017-5123OOB write $\checkmark \dagger$ XXCVE-2017-5123OOB write $\checkmark \dagger$ XXCVE-2016-10150use-after-freeXXXCVE-2016-8655use-after-free $\checkmark \dagger$ XXCVE-2016-6187heap overflowXXXCVE-2016-6187use-after-free $\checkmark \star$ XXCVE-2016-9793use-after-freeXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9793integer overflowXXXCVE-2016-9794uninitialized useX <td< td=""></td<>

Evaluation (cont.)

- Finding exploit chain in 50 wall clock minutes
- Generating tens of thousands of exploit chains
- Hard to defeat because the gadget could not be easily removed.

		Ī				First	Total	Total # of
ID	Vulnerability type	G1	G2	G3	G4	chain	time	exploitation
						(min)	(hour)	chains
CVE-2017-16995	OOB readwrite	41	114	27	201	45	37	29788
CVE-2017-15649	use-after-free	29	79	25	280	16	28	60207
CVE-2017-10661	use-after-free	28	78	30	301	17	25	49070
CVE-2017-8890	use-after-free	21	88	23	304	17	18	50471
CVE-2017-8824	use-after-free	63	101	35	306	50	70	164898
CVE-2017-7308	heap overflow	31	91	30	241	14	47	110176
CVE-2017-7184	heap overflow	31	95	31	254	24	37	93752
CVE-2017-6074	double-free	18	79	31	308	16	15	31436
CVE-2017-5123	OOB write	40	86	27	311	14	39	113466
CVE-2017-2636	double-free	18	89	29	289	29	19	26372
CVE-2016-10150	use-after-free	34	84	25	293	52	34	88499
CVE-2016-8655	use-after-free	18	109	32	260	15	17	47413
CVE-2016-6187	heap overflow	22	85	32	301	17	21	51954
CVE-2016-4557	use-after-free	21	80	21	295	16	37	40889
CVE-2017-17053	use-after-free	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CVE-2016-9793	integer overflow	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TCTF-credjar	use-after-free	35	89	25	292	25	14	82913
0CTF-knote	uninitialized use	21	89	33	318	17	36	40923
CSAW-stringIPC	OOB read&write	35	88	25	289	17	33	84414



Conclusions

- New technique: Single-shot exploitation is an effective kernel exploitation technique
 - Reduction: From "ROP is Turing Complete" to "control-flow hijacking is Turing Complete"
- New tool: Kepler is able to convert Linux kernel ROP bootstrapping task into a bounded tree-search problem and facilitate evaluation of control-flow hijacking primitive
 - Source: https://github.com/ww9210/ kepler-cfhp
- Suggestion: Kernel CFI should be deployed because other mitigations hardly stop exploitation









